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Abstrak 
 
Welding, cutting, burning, abrasive blasting, and other heat-producing operations are considered as hotwork that 
potentially creates fire hazard especially on board a ship. Fires in confined spaces such ship compartments, in the loop 
and tunnel areas are very dangerous, as the conditions are conducive to its rapid spread and also that they are in the 
vicinity of highly flammable areas. When hot work is being performed in the areas and spaces, required standards and 
procedures are essential to ensure the safety of all involved in the work. This study try to review some causes of ship fire 
accident that took place in the past and came out with suggestions for improvement in the area of hotworks  in close 
proximity to a conveyor belt. On methodology, using a  case study  of an accident on board a ship to know cause that 
often occur around conveyor belt area of Self-Unloading Carrier (SUL) especially on bulk carrier. The result of study is 
to reiterate the need for proper monitoring and and supervision of hotwork in close proximity to a conveyor belt as it has 
contributed adversely to the several fire accident that has taken place in the world shipping trade most especially on the 
self-unloading(SUL) bulk carriers. 
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1 Introduction 
Marine accident means any of the events involving a 
vessel operating in navigable waters such as the loss of 
life of, or injury to, any person on board the vessel, the 
loss of a person from the vessel, the loss of life or injury 
to a person that is caused by the vessel, the loss, or 
presumed loss, of the vessel (including the sinking or 
abandonment of the vessel), the capsizing, grounding or 
flooding of the vessel, etc (Marine Safety Act 1998). 
Cause of the accident sequence (fire, explosion, 
grounding, contact, heavy weather damage, ice damage 
and etc), fire ranks second in maritime casualties after 
stranding and grounding according to a survey of total 
loss accidents in merchant shipping over a period of 25 
years. (Kuehmayer, 2008). 
Hotwork on boar a ship includes welding, cutting, 
burning, abrasive blasting, and other heat-producing 
operations has been the cause of various disastrous such 
as risk of fire and explosion yet avoidable accidents. 
Several accident have reported by MAIB (2011) about 
fire on board ship when hot work taking place on cargo 
handling area of Self-Unloading (SUL) ship. As 
generally, most of these caused by lack of standard 
implementation such as fire detection standard, 
complacency with respect to hotwork procedure and lack 
of international standard for the use and control of 
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radioactive isotopes whereas there is radioactive 
silometers in the area of fire. 
The objective of this study try to review safety issue on 
Self-Unloading (SUL) ships related to causes fire 
accident and came out with suggestions for improvement 
in the area of hotworks in close proximity to cargo 
handling area especially on conveyor belt area. 
The methodology is by using a case study of an accident 
on board a ship to know cause that often occur around 
cargo handling area of Self-Unloading Carrier (SUL) 
especially on bulk carrier. Literature review is used as a 
reference to get recommendation about hotwork 
procedure, proper monitoring and supervision of 
hotwork in close proximity to a cargo handling area of 
SUL bulk carrier. 
The case study that used for analysis is accident is 
Yeoman Bontrup accident in 2010. Previously, the same 
case also happened in 2006. The accident included 
hotwork which had not been authorized. The company’s 
investigation found that hotwork debris had become 
trapped between a roller and the base belt, causing the 
latter to ignite. The other accident that related to 
conveyor belt accident in ship are Vanuatu-registered 
self-unloader ambassador on 1994, fire occurred on the 
cross-conveyor belt system and Liberian-registered 
self-unloader Sophie oldendorff on 2010, the accident 
also happened on the conveyor belt system. From the 
accident showed that conveyor belt is a sensitive material 
can caused fire if exposed to a spark when hotwork place 
around this area. One of the cause of accident because 
there are currently no conveyor belt material standards 
specific to the marine industry (MAIB, 2011) 
2 Literature Review 
Several researh effort have conducted about marine 
accident and the prevention. Mullai et al (2011) designed 
a conceptual model for analysis of marine accidents, 
included one of which was about fire and explosion in 
machinery, cargo, and other spaces and electrical 
installations. The model in this study was grounded on 
large amounts of empirical data and these were analyzed 
using the structural equation modeling (SEM) approach. 
Study of fire and explosion conducted by Shaluf et al 
(2003). The study analyzed major hazard installations in 
a ship and a industry company about the link between the 
major hazard organizations  is an interface between the 
installations and also discusses the causes which  led to 
this major  accident.  It was  found that the lack of 
integrity  is the main  cause  behind  the escalation  of the 
fire and explosion. Almost the same as Shaluf et al 
(2003), Schröder-Hinrichs et al (2010) also did a research 
about accident investigation in fires and explosions 
related to organizational factors and the accident. Study 
reviewed of 41 accident investigation reports related to 
machinery space ﬁres and explosions by using method of  
Human Factor Analysis and Classiﬁcation System 
(HFACS). The results of the review show that 
organizational factors were not identiﬁed by  maritime 
accident investigators to the extent expected had the IMO 
guidelines been observed. Instead, contributing factors at 
the lower end of organizational echelons are 
over-represented. 
Fire in ship became important issue over the years, even 
fire occupy the second rank in maritime casualties and 
one of the fire cause is hot work (Kuehmayer, 2008). 
Bradley (2002) reported fire and explosion incidents; 
13% of injuries and 9% of incidents involving flammable 
liquid were caused by hotwork in Great Britain on 
1998–2000. 
Other paper conducted by ILO (1996). The paper have 
made a practical recommendation about Accident 
Prevention On Board Ship At Sea and Port for use by all 
those who have responsibility for safety and health on 
board ship. Its also provide guidance to ship owners and 
seafarers and others concerned with the framing of 
provisions of this kind in both the public and private 
sectors. Some important part on this paper that related to 
study are fire prevention especially on prohibition to 
smoke, firefighting equipment, and hot work on ship 
such as welding and flame-cutting. 
Hotwork can cause of various disastrous such as risk of 
fire and explosion if near to flammable material. API 
(2009) made a practice reference of precautions 
necessary during such hotwork operations, consideration 
of the conditions and equipment in areas next to the work 
area is needful when planning activities. The fact that 
conditions can change and new hazards can be created 
during the operation also needs to be taken into account. 
For example, hydrocarbons can vapourize from the heat 
produced during hot work. 
3 Methodology 
Methodology in this paper based on case study of ship 
accident which reported by Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch, UK (2010) about the fire and 
explosion on board on Yeoman Bontrup. In general, this 
accident occur caused by hotwork activities during cargo 
loading in conveyor belt area. A more complete 
explanation in following chapter. 
Several issue which raised in this paper is safety issue 
related to the hotwork in conveyor belt area of SUL ship. 
The issue of safety in this paper are related to the fire 
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detection, containment and extinguishing in conveyor 
belt area, standard for conveyor belt system, standard for 
use and control radioactive istope, and complacency 
procedure to hotwork procedure in conceyor belt area of 
self-unloading bulk carrier. 
To propose the result, using several literature review to 
get recommendation about hotwork procedure, proper 
monitoring and supervision of hotwork in close 
proximity to a cargo handling area of SUL bulk carrier. 
4 Yeoman Bontrup Fire Accident 
Vessel Overview 
Yeoman Bontrup were the world’s largest gravity fed 
self-unloading (SUL) bulk carriers. The ships were fitted 
with five cargo holds totalling 89896.8 m3.  A complex 
system of conveyor belts discharged cargo into a hopper, 
situated in a tower immediately forward of the 
accommodation block and bridge. The cargo then passed 
onto a boom conveyor for shore reception. 
The Ship were built partly from high tensile steel, which 
had suffered extensive cracking, requiring long-term 
management with the agreement of Lloyd’s Register, the 
ships’ classification society. At the time of the accident 
the owner’s Technical Superintendent Structural Repairs 
(TSSR) was on board to carry out structural surveys and 
oversee structural repairs. 
The ship was manned by 31 Ukrainian crew, most of 
whom had served with the company for many years. The 
manning level was well in excess of the 14 crew required 
by the Safe Manning Certificate. The official working 
language was English, but the day-to-day language 
spoken was Russian. The documentation was in English 
TABLE I 
SHIP INFORMATION 
Registered owner Western Bridge (Shipping) 
Limited 
Vessel operator Aggregate Industries UK Ltd 
Manager V.Ships UK Ltd 
Flag & port of registry Bahamas, Nassau 
Type Bulk carrier – self-unloading 
(SUL) 
Date built and builder 1991, Tsuneishi Shipbuilding 
Co Japan 
IMO number 8912297 
Classification society Lloyd’s Register 
Length overall, breadth 249.9m, 38m 
Gross tonnage 55695 
Area of Accident 
A major fire and explosion occurred on board the 
Bahamian- registered, self-unloading (SUL) bulk carrier 
Yeoman Bontrup during cargo loading. The need for 
repairs to Yeoman Bontrup’s cargo discharge hopper, 
which required hotwork on arrival at the remote 
Glensanda Quarry on Loch Linnhe. Location of incident 
was alongside the shiploader jetty at Glensanda Quarry 
on Loch Linnhe, Western Scotland at 15:19 on 2 July 
2010.  
 
Accident Overview 
The accident present category of a very serious marine 
casualty. The accident created significant fire damage 
and severe distortion  to several area of the ships such as 
the self-unloading system, engine room, accommodation 
areas and steering gear compartment and detachment of 
the poop deck. 
On 2 July 2010, a major fire and explosion occurred on 
board the Bahamian- registered, self-unloading (SUL) 
bulk carrier Yeoman Bontrup during cargo loading.  The 
fire spread rapidly, resulting in significant damage to the 
vessel.  Fortunately, injuries were minor. A routine 
post-discharge survey identified the need for repairs to 
Yeoman Bontrup’s cargo discharge hopper, which 
required hotwork on arrival at the remote Glensanda 
Quarry on Loch Linnhe. 
At 1519 on the day, a fire was discovered near the bottom 
of the vertical cargo conveyor belt. Although attempts 
were made to extinguish the fire, it spread to the adjacent 
engine room. Overwhelmed by the scale of the fire, the 
crew evacuated the ship. The fire spread rapidly to the 
accommodation and into the steering gear compartment, 
which contained a wide variety of ship’s-use chemicals. 
A violent explosion followed which tore the poop deck 
from the ship. 
The most likely cause of the fire was the ignition of the 
vertical conveyor belt by hot debris from the hopper 
repair work. Although the vessel was built to the required 
standards, the fire spread quickly.  This was because 
there was no effective means of early detection, no means 
of dividing the large cargo handling area for containment 
purposes, and no fixed fire-fighting system in the cargo 
handling area to deal with the fire (MAIB, 2010). 
Investigation of the accident done by Marine Accident 
Investigation Branch, UK (2010)  discover several 
problem great cause of the accident such us high 
frequency of hotwork repair on board Yeoman Bontrup 
had led to violations of company procedures which 
compromised safety, discovered radioactive silometers in 
the area of the fire. These had not been included in the list 
of hazardous materials on board, had not been identified 
during risk assessments, and were not subject to any 
control procedures and the highly flammable of conveyor 
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belt elements. 
5 Legal Basis and General Procedure 
General Hotwork on Conveyor Belt 
Designated hotwork areas and procedures for hotwork of 
ship actually has had certain procedure regulation. For 
instance, designated hotwork areas and procedure of 
hotwork activities on Yeoman Bontrup complied to the 
V.Ships Management System (VMS). VMS designated 
for hotwork area showed that the engine room workshop 
was the only designated space that hotwork involving 
welding, burning, naked flame, high temperature, arc or a 
continuous spark process could be carried out without 
requiring prior approval from the ship’s manager. 
V.Ships Management System (VMS) for hotwork 
activities also mention about hotwork procedure. There 
are two category for the procedure, those tha required 
prior approval from the superintendent, and those that did 
not. The completed risk assessment and hotwork request 
engaged MS&Q superintendent technical superintendent 
to determine whether or not the hotwork was to be 
allowed appropriate to V.Ships Management System 
(VMS). 
Fire Detection, Containment And Extingushing For 
Conveyor Belt System 
It is difficult to detect and suppress a small fire on a 
moving belt, but effective systems do exist. They do not 
always prevent belt damage, but will prevent structural 
collapse. Detection takes the form of heat sensing. 
Generally, fire protection, detection and extinction has 
regulated by SOLAS Chapter II. There are several 
regulation part on SOLAS Chapter II which can used as a 
reference. SOLAS Chapter II, regulation 7 briefly 
explained that shall be provided fixed fire detection, fire 
alarm system and smoke detection system and also 
comply with the Fire Safety Systems Code. The entire 
requirement also required in conveyor belt area as 
hazardous area. SOLAS Chapter II in regulation 9 and 
regulation 10 each explain about containment of fire and 
fire fighting for all area of ship. 
Self-Unloading System (SUS) on Bulk Carrier 
The International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea 1974 (SOLAS), does not contain regulations 
covering the SUS equipment or conveyor belt 
requirements, and the system is not covered by 
classification society rules. Moreover, MAIB (2010) 
report mentioned that there are currently no 
conveyor belt material standards specific to the 
marine industry. 
In Yeoman Bontrup, there is using V.Ships 
Management System (VMS) to regulate the high 
risk of fires developing in the areas of the conveyor 
belts included hotwork in conveyor belt area. More 
detail of this explanation described in Self-Unloader 
Vessel Operating Instructions which is a supplement 
of the VMS. 
Standard For Use And Control Radioactive Isotope 
Cargo in the hopper of Yeoman Bontrup was 
originally monitored by two radioactive silometers. 
The silometers were designed to identify cargo 
blockages in the hopper and stop the SUS in a 
controlled manner to prevent damage. he silometers 
comprised a radiation source, a detector and an 
electronic process controller. The system had not 
been in operation for the past 10 years, the 
silometers had remained on board (MAIB, 2010). In 
this Accident, radioactive sources were not 
recorded on the VMS Technical Form- TEC 22 - 
Inventory of Potentially Hazardous Materials in the 
Ship’s Structure and Equipment. The VMS itself did 
not include any safety or general information 
relating to the radioactive source containers. 
In addition, there is regulation which is regulate to 
controlling the transport of radioactive cargoes. The 
regulation is The UK’s Statutory Instrument 1999 
No.3232, Health and Safety, The Ionising Radiation 
Regulations 1999 provides detailed requirements 
regarding the management of radioactive sources. 
Complacency To Hotwork Procedure 
Poor hotwork discipline and a failure to follow 
established guidelines is a significant cause of fires 
in ships, many of which could have been avoided by 
proper oversight. In V.Ships Management System 
(VMS) contained comprehensive instructions and 
procedures on how hotwork procedure. 
Ship’s-use chemicals 
There is a lot of guidance and regulation regarding 
the carriage of dangerous goods as cargo.  Despite 
similar risks, there is virtually no formal guidance 
concerning the stowage of ship’s-use chemicals, 
except for passing reference in COSWP of the need 
to refer to the specific MSDSs for advice on 
separation and segregation. 
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Housekeeping Problem 
Good housekeeping is an important aspect of 
effective on board management of risks and 
ensuring the crew’s wellbeing and safety. Measures 
should be taken to ensure that all such chemicals 
and oils are kept in a safe, approved stowage. While 
not always obvious, housekeeping malpractices 
have potential as causes of fire spread. 
6 Result and Discussion 
Safety issues raised in this paper are the things related to 
hotwork in close proximity to cargo handling area 
especially on conveyor belt area. First, complacency with 
respect to hotwork procedures. The crew should follow 
the procedures in the implementation of hotwork even 
there is high frequency of hotwork repairs. Second, 
although there were no classification society rules or 
SOLAS regulations governing the cargo-handling areas 
and equipment on self-unloading bulk carriers, the ship 
should be able to complied with the extant standards in 
attempts to contain and fight the fire were hampered by 
several factor such as high fire risk if conveyor belts 
caused by flammable material when hotwork conducted 
in close proximity of the area, requirement for detectors 
of smoke and fire around the conveyor belt area, 
requirement for fire containment method to prevent fire 
spread quickly through the compartment and other area 
where is close to fire source and requirement for fixed 
fire-fighting system for compartment around conveyor 
belt and cargo handling area and it is necessary to include 
into Safety Action Plan of the ship. Third, consider on the 
stowage of ship’s-use chemicals even there are no 
standard, instructions or formal guidance. This thing is to 
prevent spread of fire if the source closes to chemicals 
stowage. Fourth, poor housekeeping resulted in 
chemicals and oils being stowed in place that should not, 
can increased the risk of the spread of fire. Fifth, 
requirement of radioactive source on ships should be 
input on “Inventory of Potentially Hazardous Materials 
in the Ship’s Structure and Equipment” or follow extant 
standards about the subject. 
Recommendation for SUL owner and operator is 
requirement for establish a forum with other major 
self-unloading shipping companies to discuss mutual 
SUL safety issues, including the need for fire protection, 
detection and extinguishing systems in the cargo 
handling spaces. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper proposes several requirements for hotwork. 
Previous chapter explain overall requirement to reiterate 
the need for proper monitoring and and supervision of 
hotwork in close proximity to a conveyor belt as it has 
contributed adversely to the several fire accident that has 
taken place in the world shipping trade most especially 
on the self-unloading (SUL) bulk carriers. The 
requirement is need to ensure all things put into 
consideration both condition of area and management 
before start hotwork activities. 
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